Kidnapping in Nigeria and #bringbackourgirls – Are we missing the point? (Part 3)

Kidnapping in Nigeria and #bringbackourgirls – Are we missing the point? (Part 3):  

Now more than a month after the kidnapping, the crisis continues and so does the debate over the Nigerian response. Having conducted a “security summit” this weekend, western powers, Nigeria, and its neighbors are coordinating an intelligence-led, military response, and appear to be on the verge of declaring Boko Haram as an international terrorist organization. The Nigerian President has declared that the entire incident was an "al Qaeda-led operation.”

Is all this cooperation and attention a bad thing? No . . . unless it continues to divert attention from the underlying problem that empowers groups like Boko Haram – governance, or in this case, the lack thereof and Nigerian inability to enforce the rule of law.

The fact is that regardless how good the military is, when a country suffers from unabated crime, corruption, inequality, and governmental ineptitude, just to name a few of Nigeria’s shortcomings, then escalating insecurity will persist. This is not a problem with a military solution. Nigeria has credible military forces that are reasonably well trained and equipped (for the region) with a decent reputation as peacekeepers – outside of Nigeria. Within their own country, however, both the army and the police are routinely accused of major human rights violations; they are poorly and corruptly managed; and they are unresponsive to the security needs of the population. In sum, they are inadequately governed. No wonder they can’t mount a credible response.

But governance, to include security sector governance, can be improved if there is political will and a focused, comprehensive approach backed by internal and external oversight and robust public engagement. This kind of approach is difficult, complex, and long term, so unfortunately, it is not the direction in which things are going. Instead, the dialogue is defaulting to what we know and what we’re comfortable with –declaring war on Boko Haram and formulating a rapid military train, advise, and assist response. It won’t address the governance gap in the north; it won’t address the government’s disconnection with its own people; it won’t strengthen the Nigerians’ ability to criminalize the insurgency and enforce the law; and it doesn’t improve governance and accountability of Nigerian security forces. But it generates a lot of action, and that’s apparently going to have to be enough.